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THE STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD LEGAL
ORDER: AN OVERVIEW OF AN
ADVERSARY PROCESS
HARRY H. ALMOND, JR.*
INTRODUCTION**
Peaceful relations and adjustments of disagreements, com-
merce and the betterment of mankind will be destroyed at once
if a major armed conflict among the larger states occurs. This
was the outcome of World War II which was in turn a more
intensive thrust of violence and coercion than World War .'
When coupled with the nuclear weapons now at our disposal,
this trend of increasing devastation indicates that a future
major conflict will unleash a far greater and more lasting de-
struction of values than any of the conflicts of the past.'
* Senior Attorney Advisor in the Office of General Counsel, International Affairs,
at the Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense; B.S., Yale; M.Ch.E.,
Cornell; J.D. Harvard; LL.M. and Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political
Science; member, New York State Bar, United States Supreme Court Bar, Gray's Inn,
London, Barrister-at-Law.
** The materials in this article constitute solely the views of the author and should
not be attributed to the United States Government nor to Marquette University.
1. Arnold Toynbee quotes the Tao t8 Ching which states,
in declaring that Man's technological and organizational achievements are a
snare:
The more "sharp weapons" there are,
The more benighted will the whole land grow.
The more cunning craftsmen there are,
The more pernicious contrivances will be invented.
The more laws are promulgated,
The more thieves and bandits there will be.
A. TOYNBEE, MANKIND AND MOTHER EARTH 18 (1976), quoting THE WAY AND ITS POWER
211 (A. Waley trans. 1934).
Toynbee finds these passages have "their counterpart in the Gospel according to
St. Matthew: 'Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They toil not, neither do
they spin; and yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed
like one of these.'" Id. at 19, quoting Matt. 6:28-29.
2. World War Il introduced the destructive force of nuclear weapons. The total
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The tensions that unquestionably lead to these struggles are
ideological in nature. The claims and demands of peoples
everywhere display expectations that they can and must have
a life of greater human dignity. The current ideological con-
flicts encompass and affect the entire process of production,
since the production and marketing of goods and services affect
the well-being, wealth and prestige of all peoples. Hence, par-
ticipation in the production process is participation in the deci-
sions of government and the social economy as well.
The struggle for a world legal order, the focus of this article,
is part of the larger struggle for a world social process and is of
concern to all because no state can escape its consequences. It
is a struggle for command and control over the fundamental
decisions of public affairs in a world public order. The struggle
extends to a decision and policy-making process, distinguisha-
ble between various social orders with respect to who partici-
pates in the decision-making and who actually decides what
questions and issues. The nature of the struggle between states
with differing ideologies and fundamental attitudes was de-
scribed by Dr. Henry Kissinger as follows: "Whenever there
exists a power which considers the international order or the
manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and
other powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it is not the
adjustment of differences within a given system which will be
casualties of prolonged bombing of Germany by the Allies were 305,000 killed and
780,000 injured. The casualties resulting from the "small" atomic bombs at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were 115,000 killed, and a far larger number wounded. R. WEIGLEY, Ta
AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 359, 365 (1973).
3. Myres McDougal and Florentino Feliciano introduce their distinguished study
into the law of war with the following:
The importance today to every human being of community control of interna-
tional coercion need no pedant's footnotes to bestow upon it a sense of reality.
The increasingly rapid multiplication and diffusion of weapons capable of shat-
tering the globe, the most recent successful orbiting of artificial satellites and
launching of guided and ballistic missiles of intercontinental reach, the contin-
ued, if decelerated, hostile polarization of power in the world arena, the ever
more precarious equilibrium between the polar opponents, the high and still
rising levels in tension and expectations of comprehensive violence - all these
and many other aspects of the contemporary world arena magnify with chilling
insistence, even for the willful blind, the urgent need for rational inquiry into
the potentialities and limitations of our inherited principles and procedures for
controlling violence between peoples and for the invention and establishment
of more effective alternatives in principles and procedures.
McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General
Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 771-72 (1958) (footnotes omitted).
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at issue, but the system itself." In short, unless the western
liberal democracies and Japan systematically establish the
capabilities to support and protect their system aimed at ad-
vancing human values and human dignity against adversary
systems that seek to overthrow them, they will lose their heri-
tage.
THE STRATEGIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR A WORLD LEGAL ORDER'
The legal order and the legal process are not the exclusive
4. H. KISSINGER, A Wom RESTORwr, 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H. KISSINGER].
It is regrettable that the seriousness or gravity of this struggle is not widely recognized,
owing in part to the propensity of Western democracies to view crises as the only
matters of importance, or matters calling for "real" decisions. Of more importance, it
leaves the decisions, planning, preparation, and conditioning of people with respect to
these issues to a handful of "elites" or "experts." In contrast, the communist or
"socialist" states present us with a "command economy," even in peacetime. D.
APTER, THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (1965) refers to these as "mobilization systems"
and Lowenthal, Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy, in CHANGE IN COMIUN-
iST SYSTEMS 33 (C. Johnson ed. 1970) refers to them as "dictatorships of development."
See also Lasswell, The Garrison State, 46 AM. J. Soc. 445 (1941). All of these terms
clearly encompass the view that the communist states are driven largely toward goals,
oriented toward security, and the massive buildup of the economy essential to that
security.
Kissinger also indicates that
[t]hose ages which in retrospect seem most peaceful were least in search of
peace. Those whose quest for it seems unending appear least able to achieve
tranquillity. Whenever peace - conceived as the avoidance of war - has been
the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system
has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international com-
munity. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain princi-
ples could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an
equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.
H. KISSINGER, supra note 4, at 1.
5. Saul Cohen declares:
Political relations among states are influenced by an area's strategic value.
These relations in turn affect this value. We can view the strategic importance
of parts of the earth's surface in terms of three dimensions: space, time, and
national vantage points. The term space includes natural resources or location
with respect to the lines of movement that carry these resources. But the endow-
ments of areas change, in time, with technological innovation. Moreover, what
is considered strategically important to one state may be unimportant to an-
other ...
Finally, an area's strategic significance cannot be assessed in terms of the
needs of a single power core. Two parties, and frequently more, will be involved.
Thus, Mainland China, the United States, the U.S.S.R., Japan, and Australia
are all directly concerned with Korea and Southeast Asia. While Eastern Europe
is of primary concern to the U.S.S.R. and to Maritime Europe, as is North Africa
to Maritime Europe, the fate of these regions is of secondary importance to other
power cores of varying sizes and strength.
S. COHEN, GEOGRAPHY AND POLMcS IN A WORLD DivmD xx (2d ed. 1973).
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province of lawyers or experts, particularly with respect to the
development of international law. A major reason for this is
that the fundamental source of international law arises out of
the practices of states. The practice of a state is the outcome
of the entire decision-making process within the state. It re-
flects the policies and goals of both the citizens and their lead-
ers. A state whose citizens instruct their legislature to withdraw
from areas of influence or demand that their military capabili-
ties be unilaterally reduced, for whatever reason, will engage in
a practice through the exercise of its foreign policy that will
eschew claims or demands with respect to other states. Strong
internal claims for isolationist foreign policy, for example, will
cause a state to withdraw its demands on other states to estab-
lish a world order. Such a policy will promote claims of exclu-
sivity, sovereignty, independence or autonomy. While these
policies are not the sole thrust of a state's practice, to the
extent they are established and become effective, they will af-
fect what that state decides, how it decides and the weight of
its decisions as a member of a world community of states.
A strategic instrument of long established importance in
each state's foreign policy has been the military forces. When
in an appropriate state of readiness, the military forces enable
a state to exercise its political will and establish its policies or
shape the policies of other states. Admiral Gorshkov of the
U.S.S.R. revealed his country's recognition of the weight to be
given military strategy:
Many examples from history attest to the fact that under
feudalism, as well as under capitalism, problems of foreign
policy have always been decided on the basis of the military
strength of the "negotiating" sides, and the potential military
strength of one State or another, created in accordance with
its economic resources and taking into account its political
orientation, frequently made it possible for it to implement
an advantageous policy to the detriment of other States not
possessing commensurate military strength. The develop-
ment of armed forces is very directly tied in with the history
of socio-economic systems and the methods of material pro-
duction inherent in them.8
6. S. GoRssKov, SEA POWER OF THE STATE iv (1976). Admiral Gorshkov emphasizes




The development of international law is a development of
restraints which states are willing to share during their
"peacetime" struggle toward shaping a world social and legal
order. Admiral Gorshkov indicated his awareness of this pro-
cess and its significance during times other than armed con-
flict. He also demonstrated his awareness of the subordination
of the military instrumentality or strategy - as well as its
separate and reinforcing importance - in the process of seek-
ing the goals of the U.S.S.R. He indicated clearly that the
"political" element controls at every point.
This interrelationship of politics and war is readily appar-
ent from one writer's analysis of Karl von Clausewitz's treatise,
On War:
Clausewitz only rarely employed the concept "power"
(Macht), and then essentially for comparing the power of
belligerents (Machtverhaltnisse). (It applied to military po-
tential.) The relation of forces, in effect, governs the various
manners of conducting war. Ordinarily, it is the superior side
that attacks because defense is the strongest form of war. The
erosion of strength intrinsic in the attack permits the de-
fender first to resist, then to counterattack. Clausewitz at-
tributes a particular importance to number. He assumes that
an approximatequalitative equality exists among European
armies; thus the conquest of territory, to the extent that it
raises new troops, increases the power of the state as well as
the effectiveness of the army. But Clausewitz, we must not
forget, understood the lesson of the French Revolution: the
participation of the people in war, in resistance, and their
eventual bearing of arms assume a harmony between those
Marxism considers the geographical medium, of which the World Ocean is a
most important element, to be among the main factors influencing the develop-
ment of human society .... Military operations at sea, as well as on land, are
subordinate to the general, constantly functioning laws, and they cannot be
conducted in isolation from the goals of that policy of which the war is an
extension. V.I. Lenin pointed out that "Policy is a tough process, while war is
merely a tool, and not the reverse. Consequently, the only recourse is to subordi-
nate the military point of view to the political." Therefore, it is interesting under
present day conditions to follow from an historical point of view the dialectical
relationship between the development of naval forces and the goals of that
policy of the States which they were designed to serve .... The development
of armed forces is very directly tied in with the history of socio-economic systems
and the methods of material production inherent in them. Their rise or fall has
been determined by the process of development or disintegration of one social
system or another.
Id. at ii-iii (footnote omitted).
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who govern and those who are no longer subjects, but citi-
zens. He does not, then, conceive of war as a simple tool for
the enlargement of territory, having as an end in itself the
reinforcement of the military instrument. It is true that the
subordination of the military commander to the statesman,
when the two roles are not combined, is of major pragmatic
significance: only the chief of state can consider relationships
on a global scale, the political risks (intervention of other
states) of a certain strategy or military victory; but pragmatic
considerations do not exhaust the content of the primacy of
politics.
7
7. Aron, Reason, Passion, and Power in the Thought of Clausewitz, 39 Soc. RES.
599, 612-13 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Aron]. Joshua suggests that the "peacetime"
struggle embodies the same overall thrust and dynamism as that displayed in war,
with the same process turned to differing modalities. This occurs through marshalling
"forces" - presumably all those that bear on decision and policy - to shape future
policy. She declares: "According to the Soviets, detente - or peaceful coexistence -
has become possible because the West has been forced to recognize the changing
correlation of forces [i.e., a Soviet term denoting world balance of power in all its
aspects - political, military, economic, etc.] and is therefore accommodating to rising
Soviet Power." Joshua, Detente in Soviet Strategy (September 2, 1975) (Dep't of Def.).
Presumably the U.S., without using the term, is also engaged in this "power process."
See H. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950). See generally A. GEORGE,
D. HALL & W. SIMONS, THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY (1971); A. GEORGE & R.
SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1974); and E. LUTTWAK, THE POLmI-
CAL USES OF SEA POWER (1974).
Daniel O'Connell emphasizes that in using military forces, without armed hostili-
ties, to project a major policy, the essence is superior force, with the threat first under-
keyed, but, with the capabilities and the will to escalate, in order to secure the desired
policy outcome. D. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 53-69 (1975)
(reviewing the Cuban missile crisis). Vasilii Sokolovskiy indicates the importance of
nuclear weapons to ensuring a "quick" victory, hence assuring the movement of the
"classes" toward their goals of peaceful socialism. According to Sokolovskiy,
[m]ilitary strategy is a system of scientific knowledge dealing with the laws of
war as an armed conflict in the name of definite class interests.
Military strategy under conditions of modem war becomes the strategy of
deep nuclear rocket strikes in conjunction with the operations of all services of
the armed forces in order to effect a simultaneous defeat and destruction of the
economic potential and armed forces throughout the enemy territory, thus ac-
complishing the war aims within a short time period.
Under conditions of nuclear rocket war, the strategic principle of the econ-
omy of forces appears in a new light. [emphasis in original]. It is apparent that
when the very outcome of the war depends largely on the number and the
effectiveness of the application of effort at the very beginning of the war, it is
hardly reasonable to count on using the potential capabilities of a country and
to reserve a large part of the forces for conducting military operations during
later periods of the war. [emphasis added].
V. SOKOLOVSKIY, SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY 11-12 (3d ed. 1975). Sokolovskiy's text is
replete with references to aggression, aggressive and hostile postures of the West, the
"imperialist" as the source of the unjust war, the rightness of the cause of the
[Vol. 61:1
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To understand the practices of states as they pertain to the
establishment of their policies and therefore toward the law
which they seek to share with other states, it is necessary to
examine the various strategic instruments which states have at
their disposal. First, however, the military instrument and the
strategy it affords must be closely examined.
Under current conditions what are the possibilities and lim-
its in the use of the military instrument as a stragegy to estab-
lish a nation's policy? As already noted, the world arena exhib-
its claims among the competing states, or blocs of states, for
command and control over the world order itself - over the
decisions pertaining to that order, including those with respect
to a world legal order. The broader perspectives of the thrust
of this competition or struggle are less visible than are other
perspectives that tend to mask its importance. Unquestiona-
bly, with greater interdependence and mobility among states,
and with increased means for communication, there is a strong
impetus for cooperative effort, common goals, common policies
and common means for implementing these policies.8 In this
process there is a marked shift, or more correctly, an expected
shift from a heavy reliance on the use of military strategies
toward the use of other strategies which can shape and influ-
ence the policies of adversary states. It is in this shift that great
opportunities exist for the western liberal democracies to estab-
lish and maintain the momentum toward their objectives.
Therefore, if the process toward western goals of human
values and toward greater promotion of human dignity is to
proceed, a realistic appraisal of the military stragegy is re-
quired. Undoubtedly military conquest alone is neither a nec-
essary nor sufficient instrument to achieve command and con-
trol over the decision and value orienting process. But the mili-
tary capability and the will to exercise and use it, are essential.
"proletariat," and the legitimacy of the wars of national liberation against colonial
powers. For a member of a "peace-loving" socialist State, the language used seems
dangerously out of place. Id. at 5-46.
8. Myres McDougal explains these policies as follows:
From a comprehensive global perspective, one may today observe that of the
effective decisions which constitute the world power process, some are taken
inclusively, in the sense that several or many or all states participate in the
making of such decisions, and others are taken exclusively, with only a single
state or a fdw states making relatively unilateral determination of issues.
McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented
Perspective, 4 S.D. L. REv. 25 (1959) (footnote omitted).
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If that capability is secured, a state can use more effectively
the other strategies at its disposal.
If a state's military capability is insecure or suspect, all
other strategies are in jeopardy as long as its adversaries de-
velop their military capabilities and maintain them in readi-
ness. Moreover, a state's alliances that are largely dependent
upon military capabilities and military strategy become ten-
uous and unreliable. As the military capability of the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. is now configured, the nuclear weapons afford
only a blanket of deterrence.' Beneath this blanket exists the
possibility that armed conflicts would be used to further a na-
tion's policy. However, as long as such conflicts remain conven-
tional and limited, it is unlikely that there is a reasonable basis
to expect that they may remain manageable or that the objec-
tives of the states involved could be realized. Therefore, it is
only as long as the state's military technology is promoted to
keep pace with that of potential adversaries that the nuclear
deterrent itself will remain effective.
The effectiveness of limitations upon the use of nuclear
weapons in armed conflict is, of course, a speculative matter
and is proposed here simply for analysis in terms of the man-
ageability of conflict. All commentators are agreed that the
management or outcome of a nuclear conflict, particularly be-
tween major adversaries, cannot be determined by the preced-
ent of previous armed conflicts. It is possible that the capabili-
ties and the institutions devised to manage and conduct affairs
as complex as a major armed conflict will fall short of what is
required to protect the fundamental values of the nation-states
9. The nuclear deterrent has both legal and technical elements. Both require, how-
ever, on their own terms and criteria, that the mass destruction force capabitities,
weaponry, delivery systems and verification be maintained in balance on a continuous
basis, because this is the basis of a balanced security. Owing to asymmetries this is
not a one-for-one balance. And the assessment of the balance is therefore a complex
but not impossible process. Because the technologies are multidimensional in nature,
ranging across peacetime and military applications, and, in any event the technologies
are not verifiable, each state in the balance has no choice but to maintain its own
research and development efforts at a high level - in the interests of its economy and
military capability. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an agreement declaring, "both sides
will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the
recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be
inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations" between them. Limitation
of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 21, 1973 United States-Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 24 U.S.T. 1472, T.I.A.S. No. 7653. The notion of equality, of course, has
its counterpart in international law and in the United Nations Charter.
[Vol. 61:1
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involved, or even of the world community. Bearing in mind
that the armed conflict is an extension of a state's decision
making process, this means that the entire decision making
process for maintaining authority and control in a nuclear con-
flict could be destroyed.
The limited use of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict
offer perhaps a less formidable challenge to the above premises.
It is difficult, however, to conceive of a limited conflict between
major adversaries. It is also difficult to conceive of a limited use
of weapons in such a conflict that will not escalate to the use
of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons. Furthermore,
it is difficult to conceive that the oitcome would not be a major
worldwide conflict without limitation as to the weapon used.
Again, regarding the armed conflict as a decision matrix, it is
unclear whether the decisions and policies of states with funda-
mentally differing ideologies in such a conflict would lead to
resolution of differences among themselves by limiting an
armed conflict once it has begun.'0
Because the perspectives and limitations of military con-
quest and the use of military strategies in an actual conflict are
fully recognized by major states today, the strategies upon
which they must concentrate necessarily shift in their search
for command and control over the decision process of a world
public order. It bears emphasis that such other strategies be-
come effective in current practice only while an equal balance
in military capabilities and the will to use them as deterrents
are maintained.
The use of military and nonmilitary strategies (i.e., eco-
nomic, diplomatic and ideological strategies) is the use of a
10. Studies of the decision, policy and organizational features with respect to effi-
cient or effective management of armed conflict are relatively rare. According to
Harvey DeWeerd, when the United States entered into the First World War it lacked
the organizational base to carry on that war, and, unquestionably this weakness was
not exploited because of the way in which that conflict developed and the sea protec-
tion the U.S. enjoyed. H. DEWEERD, PRESIDENT WILSON FIGHTS His WAR 9 (1968). The
conclusion to that war as embodied in the Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations
revealed that the Allies were unable to benefit with respect to moving a world social
and legal order constructively ahead - their wars were not "an instrument of national
policy," but of uncertainty. DeWeerd summarizes President Wilson's part in this
process as follows: "Against the advice of his friends and advisers, Wilson stubbornly
refused to compromise with his adversaries in the Senate over reservations to the peace
treaty. In the end he destroyed the fruits of victory, which were won at such a great
cost in lives and suffering." Id. at 252.
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variety of policy instruments directed toward securing a policy
base or implementing a particular policy. Used consistently,
together they may reinforce a nation's overall foreign policy -
even operating synergistically. Used improperly or without
common purpose, they provide opportunities for the adversary.
Law, prticularly international law, is a future oriented pol-
icy and therefore its development draws upon such strategies.
It reflects the fact that "certain past uniformities in decision
will, and should, be observed in the future," owing to the
"crystallization of perspectives among peoples, and especially
among their effective decision makers."" The adversary pro-
cess among states reveals the competition among them that is
operating through their practice and therefore through the
strategies employed with that practice to establish a favored
policy. The law shared by these adversary law making entities
is the law that comes out of this process of competing claims
and demands.
A nation's practice in its relations with other states clearly
has law making effects. It is exercised through state decisions
and action, and operates through a variety of strategies deliber-
ately pursued as a means toward desired goals. When these
strategies are made to operate toward a nation's purposes and
goals they reinforce one another and are then revealed as that
nation's "foreign policy." The effectiveness of the strategies
employed is measured by the overall results of that policy.
The results are reflected in that foreign policy because they
indicate how states decide certain vital matters, how they par-
ticipate in making those decisions in the world arena and how
effectively they influence and shape the policies of other states.
Moreover, these results indicate who may claim to be a major
"'power" in a decision making process over which a state has,
appropriate to its power, a fair share of command and control.
Without the ability to apply military, economic, diplomatic
and ideological strategies effectively, the United States and its
allies would be gravely weakened in their quest for a world legal
order compatible with their values and principles. They would
be unable to promote or protect them. Therefore, under the
nuclear deterrent and during the balancing out of military cap-




abilities and strategies (i.e., the use of such capabilities as a
deterrent), these states must actively promote their influence
through the other strategies.
Although policies aimed at arms control and disarmament
offer to some the hope of stemming the costs or the need for a
nuclear deterrence cover established by the balance of equal
security in nuclear weapons and their use, there are limits to
the realistic expectations of such policies. Genuine disarma-
ment supports and requires an operative world order, but it
neither creates such an order nor does away with the tensions
that create insecurity.
An effective and shared policy of arms control among adver-
sary nations calls for reliance and mutual trust among them.
This requires major shifts in the adversary ideologies to accom-
modate fundamentally differing attitudes regarding the major
states' expectations of a world order or a shared world order.
Until those conditions are reached, states are compelled to
track and pace one another with respect to their weapons sys-
tems and weapons technology, monitor or police one another's
actions to ensure appropriate verification of compliance with
their arms control agreements and establish a process of chal-
lenge and response with regard to alleged violations. Arms con-
trol efforts therefrom weave in and out among the foreign poli-
cies of each nation and are directed to the security interests as
each sees them."2
12. In analyzing Clausewitz's classic, ON WAR, Raymond Aron declares:
Those who have never read Clausewitz, or who have only read him in extracts,
cite with regularity the following: war is a continuation of politics by other
means. The exact text of the first book reads "continuation of political com-
merce or relations (Verkehr) by other means." But this part of the sentence is
less important than that which precedes it: "war is a real political instrument"
- this expresses more clearly the essential idea of the subordination of the
military means to the political end. Now this idea is opposed to militaristic
philosophy - the state in the service of the army, it authorizes an interpretation
which appears to me to express at least one of Clausewitz's intentions: even in
time of war, politics, i.e., the intelligence of the personified state, must retain
its sovereignty.
Aron, supra note 7, at 609. See also Almond, Law and Armed Conflict: Some of the
Shared Policies, 9 CASE W. Ras. J. OF INT'L L. 175 (1977).
With respect to human rights in the "international sense," and its relationship to
the international order, Karl Birnbaum states:
What does seem essential in this context [the Belgrade meetings on the Helsinki
Accords] is- to convey to the governments of the Warsaw Pact countries that
Western support for human rights movements in the East does not reflect an
aspiration to upset the political and social systems in these states. The goal
19771
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Therefore, assuming that the U.S. maintains its military
capabilities in full readiness and exercises its military strate-
gies where appropriate, the U.S. is in a position where it has
definite advantages with respect to promoting its economic
strategies. These strategies can be promoted to prove that
western economies and the marketing systems for the distribu-
tion and allocation of goods developed in the west serve the
values of their peoples and peoples everywhere. 13 Fulfilling
must be to make it clear that Western advocacy of respect for human rights is
motivated in part by a concern for the predicament of individuals flowing from
an appreciation of the intrinsic value of each human being; but it also derives
from the conviction that deference to the aspirations of human rights move-
ments is the best guarantee that accumulated problems will not one day ex-
plode, with incalculable risks for peace in Europe and throughout the world.
Birnbaum, Human Rights and East-West Relations, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 783, 798-99
(1977) (footnote omitted). The United Nations Charter clearly shows the United Na-
tions professed concern for human rights in the Preamble, and operative Articles 1,
13, 55, 62 and 76.
Richard Lowenthal refers to the need for security among the communist elites as
follows:
The ruling bureaucracy will tend to be rational and legal in its methods so long
as it does not feel threatened in its privileged position by pressures from below;
but once such pressures make themselves felt, it will be quick to proclaim that
the fatherland is in danger, and to tamper with legal guarantees in the name of
a national emergency.
Lowenthal, Developments vs. Utopia in Communist Policy, in CHANGE IN COMMUNIST
SYSTEMS 33, 116 (C. Johnson ed. 1970). For a text on Marxism, see generally G. LICHT-
HEIM, MARXISM (1961).
13. P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey indicate the difficulty with establishing such an
order, and the remote chance that it will benefit the lesser developed states. Bauer &
Yamey, Against the New Economic Order, 63 COMMENTARY 25 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Bauer & Yamey]. The Declaration on such an "order" was adopted in May 1974,
in the United Nations General Assembly without a vote, but subjected to
"reservations" by a number of states, including the U.S. and Britain. REPORT ON THE
SIXTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CMND. No. 6031
(1975); REPORT ON THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY CMND. No. 6308 (1975). Bauer and Yamey, expressing a conservative view,
state,
[t]he declaration is in essence the latest stage in the advocacy of large-scale
aid from the West to the less-developed world. What is new is the more explicit
link between the alleged responsibility of the West for the poverty of the less-
developed world and the duty of the West to "correct inequalities and redress
existing injustices.
Bauer & Yamey, supra note 13, at 25. This quotation indicates quite clearly two
fundamental elements: (a) that the communist world is not responsible and the duty
does not extend to them; and (b) the criteria is not in terms of economic principles
and determinants, but in terms of the "legal" criteria of "justice."
The thrust of the "radical element" is suggested in the citation of an unnamed civil
servant in a Third World country who declared: "We shall produce any statistic that
we think will help us to get as much money out of the United States as we possibly
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these objectives means strengthening western economies and
establishing a cooperative effort among like-minded economies
to strengthen the system they share. The economy must serve
the fundamental goals of human dignity by establishing access
and opportunity to their peoples to share in the material re-
sources and in producing them. Furthermore, there must be a
concerted effort to oppose the action or conduct of the so-called
socialist or communist states whose policies seek in every way
to put the western economies in jeopardy while draining them
of their technology and experience.
The talents, and therefore the power, that underlie the
western economic systems have yet to be unleashed. Under
present demands for a "new international economic order"
can. Statistics which we do not have, but which we need to justify our demands, we
shall simply fabricate." Id. at 26. Bauer and Yamey dispute the view that the realloca-
tion of wealth will reach the desired outcomes:
Large-scale transfer of wealth will not, however, insure the prosperity of any
particular Third World country, let alone the Third World as a whole. This is
so simply because economic achievement and progress depend primarily on
favorable domestic factors, including government policies. The presence of fa-
vorable factors cannot be taken for granted anywhere, and indeed are singularly
absent in many Third World countries. While wealth transfers would reduce
income differences between the West and the Third World, they would do so
principally by reducing incomes in the West rather than by increasing produc-
tivity, and hence sustainable incomes, in the Third World. Moreover, the NIEO
program is not likely to promote harmony among Third World countries. Con-
tention is bound to arise over the division of the wealth to be transferred and
over the effects of NIEO policies such as commodity schemes and industrial
protection.
The pursuit of these ends will require an immense extension of the use of
coercive power of governments over individuals, for nothing else would be capa-
ble of bringing about any substantial homogenization, nationally as well as
internationally, of highly diverse nations, societies, groups, and individuals. It
will provoke acute political and social tensions. It will divert people's energies
and resources from economic to political activity. A new international economic
order may indeed emerge - but it will not be one either of freedom or of
prosperity.
Id. at 31. The reach of such a program into unbalancing the bases of power, and
therefore the strategic bases, between the U.S. and the West and the U.S.S.R. and its
allies is, if the above analysis is accepted, clear. For other views of this issue, see Beim,
Rescuing the LDCS, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 717 (1977); Cleveland & Brittain, Are the LDCS
in Over Their Heads?, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 732 (1977). Addressing the enormous LDC trade
debt, Beim declares: "We cannot be both internationalists in finance and protection-
ists in trade, accommodating the LDCs' borrowing needs but denying them the means
to earn their way out of debt by providing us with goods and services." Beim, Rescuing
the LDCS, 55 FOREIGN AFF. at 731.
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But see Treaty on Stationing of Soviet Troops, October 18, 1968, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics-Czechoslovakia. In this treaty the U.S.S.R. justified having its
troops in Czechoslovakia "for the purposes of ensuring the security of the countries of
the socialist commonwealth against the increasing revanchist aspirations of the West
German Militarist forces." Id. at art. 1. The U.S.S.R. also declared that the
"temporary presence of these troops did not violate the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia.
Id. at art. 2. The treaty was, of course, signed and ratified by the appropriate represent-
atives of both countries.
Karl Birnbaum examined the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia and concluded,
the Soviet Party leadership has insisted on retaining in major documents regu-
lating Soviet-East European relations the key concept of "socialist [or prole-
tarian] internationalism," a modification of the "limited sovereignty" principle
invoked to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In addition, Moscow
has attempted to equate the observance of the rules of proletarian internation-
alism with a stance of fundamental solidarity with the U.S.S.R., thereby under-
lining the claim that the Soviet Party should remain the ultimate arbiter of the
collective interests of the Warsaw Pact Countries.
Birnbaum, Human Rights and East-West Relations, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 783, 788 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). With respect to the "differences" or distinctions by various publi-
cists of wars of national liberation, self-determination, and the socialist common-
wealth, a Pravda article justifying intervention in Czechoslovakia declared:
The antisocialist elements in Czechoslovakia actually covered up the de-
mand for so-called neutrality and Czechoslovakia's withdrawal from the social-
ist community with talk about the right of nations to self-determination.
However, the implementation of such "self-determination," in other words,
Czechoslovakia's detachment from the socialist community, would have come
into conflict with its own vital interests and would have been detrimental to the
other socialist states.
Laws and legal norms are subjected to the laws of the class struggle, the laws
of social development. These laws are clearly formulated in Marxist-Leninist
teaching, in the documents jointly adopted by the Communist and Workers'
Parties.
Formally juridical reasoning must not overshadow a class approach to the
matter. One who does it, thus losing the only correct class criterion in assessing
legal norms, begins to measure events with a yardstick of bourgeois law.
Pravda, September 25, 1968, reprinted in N.Y. Times, September 27, 1968, § 1, at 3,
col. 1. For documentation of objections by communist parties of various countries see
SUBCOMM. ON NAT'L SECURITY AND INT'L OPERATIONS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG. IST SESS., CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE
(Comm. Print 1969). Some believe that the same reasoning would be applied to the
"principle" of "detente" by Soviet interpretors. See, e.g., Joshua, Detente in Soviet
Strategy (September 2, 1975) (Dep't of Def.).
Hans Kelsen declares:
The true meaning of a legal norm is usually supposed to be the one which
corresponds to the will of the legislator. But it is more than doubtful whether
there exists at all such a thing as the "will of the legislator," especially where
the law is the result of a complex procedure in which many individuals partici-
pate. . ..
The fact that the legal norms as formulated in words having frequently more
than one meaning is the reason why every legal instrument has its own life, more
or less independent of the wishes and expectations of its begetters.
Preface to H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS at xiv (1950).
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they are put on the defensive.'4 The main thrust of the de-
mands of a large number of other states is to oppose the western
system and its fundamental values and to revolutionize or re-
place it with a new, more legitimate and just system of produc-
tion that employs cartels, quotas and price fixing. These other
states claim that this system of socializing the world economy
is just, and the struggle against the western economies is the
peace time equivalent of the just war.
In addition to the economic strategies, the western states,
which for these purposes include Japan, must attend more
firmly to the diplomatic strategies available to them in negotia-
tions, diplomatic conferences and the United Nations forum.
The diplomatic strategies include the activities of the delegates
or representatives of the U.S., as well as those of ambassadors
and of officials acting out of the executive or even the legisla-
tive branch of government. These strategies are aimed at rein-
forcing the actions of allies and at protesting conduct of other
states that is inconsistent with what the U.S. claims is lawful.
Furthermore, these diplomatic strategies enter into the confer-
ences with allies and the joint efforts at policy within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization of Ameri-
can States, as well as within a variety of special organizations.
With respect to its allies the U.S. must act jointly to strengthen
its positions, primarily to ensure that the fundamental princi-
ples and process which encompass the policies of the west are
shared in the west and asserted against adversary states with
a view toward influencing and reshaping their foreign policies.
In order to ensure the promotion and protection of the
human values that underlie these policies, the west must show
itself to be firmly committed to the principles of international
14. According to P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, the "[flour widely supported com-
ponents of the NIEO are staples of international conferences." Bauer & Yamey, supra
note 13, at 29. Their analysis points out that each of these is subject to serious objec-
tion. The components are commodity agreements, debt cancellation, official or en-
forced transfers of technology, and multinationalization of aid. Of particular interest,
and more immediate to the concern of states, is the translation of these proposals into
the demands, and therefore the resistance, of the same bloc of states, in the Law of
the Sea Conferences. The fundamental debate which centers on almost identical is-
sues, is addressed to the deep seabeds and how they will be exploited, who will benefit,
and, in particular, who will decide about the entire allocating process. We can antici-
pate the same set of demands will be extended into the future claims for treaties in
outer space. Each of them use the now fashionable "principle" that these demands
follow from the right of all peoples - "the common heritage of mankind."
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law that deny credence to distorted applications of western
values under the guise of "peaceful coexistence," "detente"
and the doctrinal assertions in the Brezhnev doctrine of a
"socialist commonwealth of States."'15 Protecting western prin-
ciples requires resistance to attempts by communist states to
take over and apply against their own values the liberal princi-
ples of the west. A fundamental objective of diplomatic strate-
gies must be the promotion of the fundamental values prized
in the west. 6
Finally, the ideological strategies of communist states place
a great strain on western resources because they create illusory
expectations that lead to tensions and destabilization. Com-
munist bloc states have in large measure succeeded in impos-
ing, through communist doctrine, a widely held belief on the
part of many that their doctrine contains and advances
"justice" and basic human rights. That doctrine purports to
establish human rights in terms of anticipated outcomes in the
productive performance of communist societies. To the unini-
tiated it suggests wide participation in the governmental pro-
cess. However, with respect to participation by the "peoples"
of the world in their own affairs, as set out in the United Na-
tions Charter, the actual practices of states in the world legal
15. The "socialist commonwealth of States" - as doctrine - has been introduced
as a new and fundamental principle of international law under the Brezhnev
"doctrine." See Legal Aspects of the Invasion and Occupation of Czechoslovakia,
DEP'T STATE BULL., at 394-401 (October 14, 1968).
16. The diplomatic strategies of states and their "practice" interact. In regard to
the high seas and this interaction, Professor McDougal's observations are enlightening:
Throughout the centuries of its development, one may observe the regime of the
high seas as not a static body of absolute rules but rather a living, growing,
customary law, grounded in the claims, practices, and sanctioning expectations
of nation-states, and changing as the demands and expectations of decision-
makers are changed by the exigencies of new social and economic interests, by
the imperatives of an ever-developing technology and by other continually
evolving conditions in the world arena. From the perspective of realistic descrip-
tion, the public order of the high seas is not a mere body of rules, but a whole
decision-making process, including both a structure of authorized decision-
makers and a body of highly flexible, inherited prescriptions: it is a continuous
process of interaction in which the decision-makers of individual nation-states
unilaterially put forward claims of the most diverse and conflicting character
to the use of the world's seas, and in which other decision-makers, external to
the demanding nation-state and including both national and international offi-
cials, weigh and appraise these competing claims in terms of the interests of the
world community and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject
them.
M. McDoUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 773 (1960) (footnote omitted).
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order suggest a greater concern with the interaction of states
themselves. This in turn suggests that the fundamental ele-
ments flowing between the states should be expressed in terms
of the power factor. States are said to be engaged in power
politics, and their law is cynically assessed as that which
speaks to or is backed by power. In this process, the expecta-
tions of peoples for greater human dignity is submerged.
This prevailing set of beliefs reinforces those who wish to
promote a power process, and denies to the peoples of the world
a concern or participation in the process affirming the values
which they prize. The essential process among states, which is
in part what the struggle for the world social and legal order is
all about, is more than a process directed to the allocation of
authority, structures, institutions and procedures among deci-
sion and policy entities. Like the process that led to the devel-
opment of the United States Constitution, there must be a
concern not only with the creation and partition of power, but
also with the necessary restraints upon government, its abuse
and the measures to deal with that abuse. The checks and
balances found in the wisdom of James Madison offer some
hints on managing the power process:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to
those who administer each department the necessary consti-
tutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments
of the others. . . . It may be a reflection on human nature,
that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses
of government. . . If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself. . ..
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests,
the defect of better motives, might be traced through the
whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We
see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distribu-
tions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and ar-
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range the several offices in such a manner as that each may
be a check on the other.'
7
These precepts find their way naturally and readily into the
affairs of states and their conduct with one another. The same
officials are frequently engaged in dual functions establishing
the external, national policies of their own nations, as well as
seeking to establish the constitutive policies and law that will
operate to regulate the conduct between nations. The reality of
conflict, as Rolf Dahrendorf has indicated,18 is clear enough so
that we must not unrealistically seek for conflict settlement in
the sense of finality, but for conflict regulation, in the sense of
management. The balancing of power 9 through the checks and
17. A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST OR THE NEW CONSTITUTION
347-48 (1945). Madison favored as part of the scheme of checks and balances a
"pluralism":
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the
administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against
by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments ...
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different govern-
ments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself.
• * * It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society
against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different
classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against
this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the major-
ity - that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society
so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination
of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
Id. at 349-50.
18. R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1959).
19. Technological change with impacts upon military advancement or moderniza-
tion and with peaceful applications must be esatablished, according to Moore, under
social controls.
Nearly all of current technical innovation is deliberate. This means, concretely,
that technological change is organized and institutionalized. The "pure" knowl-
edge that is expanded and the useful knowledge that is applied are almost
entirely a function of the amount and type of support given to some fields and
projects, and thus not to others. There is nothing in abstract or applicable
knowledge itself that would account for its expansion or use without human
intervention.
W. MooRE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 24 (1972). Moore presumably would like
to have technological "impact" statements comparable to those for the environment
or arms control:
The assembly of teams of experts to engage in technological assessment is thus
itself an interesting bit of social technology. . . . Other instruments of social
control are available, most notably the legislative, administrative, and even
judicial processes afforded by law. These still tend to be remedial rather than
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balances described by Madison calls for more imaginative dip-
lomatic and ideological strategies because the balance must be
maintained against any use of nuclear weaponry.
Therefore, with the strategic instruments to serve western
policies in view, the United States must pursue as a fundamen-
tal purpose to be relentlessly asserted, the human values we
seek to claim and promote. In the use of these strategies we
must unquestionably "keep our powder dry," for man exists in
a dangerous world, and must have the certainty of a sound
military instrument to promote and implement within the west
and among the western nations and Japan the world social and
legal process which will secure our goals.
CONCLUSION
The struggle for a world order and a world legal order is part
of the dialectics of confrontation, competition and tension in
the world arena today. These crises, too often obscured by the
charades of peaceful intercourse, afford us great opportunities
to draw from the real dialectic process the outcomes favorable
to the west. In the process of constituting a future world order,
the military instrument is in part foreclosed under penalty of
great and cataclysmic destruction to world society. The grow-
ing size of weapons systems and their means for delivery, cou-
pled with dynamic advances in military technology, compel us
to recognize and deal with this policy issue within the balanc-
ing process of deterrence, and compel us to make it work until
disarmament can effectively be obtained.
Particular emphasis must be given to the practices of states
and the strategies they have at their disposal. The United
States is committed in its maritime practice, for example, to
claim free use of the seas. It is similarly committed to project
its military forces abroad as a means to support its foreign
policies and as an adjunct to those policies. The practices asso-
ciated with each of the strategies must be used and must rein-
force one another. The agreements entered into and diplomatic
positions taken must reach toward favored objectives. The eco-
nomic strategies must be supported and promoted by western
preventive. The ultimate control of technology, including harmful applications





diplomacy and law. If the western states can benefit from their
own economies, so also can those states which are emerging on
the world scene and seeking tried and effective paths toward
economic development. 20 The ideological struggle must be to-
ward the unfolding of a rising expectation among peoples
everywhere that prized principles will guide the west's tactics,
strategies and goals.
Failure in these efforts, or even in making appropriate at-
tempts, might lead to weakness which would encourage adver-
saries to resort to adventurism or even to using military strate-
gies which appear relatively risk-free. This orientation could be
fatal to all concerned since the decision to enter into armed
conflict among the great powers today is in large measure based
only on the irrational or the absurd. Failure to maintain tech-
nology - research and development (including testing) -
however, might lead to a serious imbalance, making a threat
of superior force so credible that no armed conflict would occur.
Failure on our part to persist in our purpose to the extent of
stopping short of an armed conflict would lead to an erosion of
prized values. If this is allowed to occur, the values and the
social and legal order will fall short of the declared commit-
ments of the western states, and in a realistic sense, the west
would deserve to lose them. The choices here are not unlimited,
and the assertion of policy, the shaping of appropriate strate-
20. P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey declare:
Income and wealth are normally earned, that is produced, and not taken or
extracted from others. Economic contacts with the West, which usually have
benefited the West, [i.e., from their colonies] have at the same time enabled
people in Third World countries to improve their productivity by giving them
access to markets, by making available to them a wide variety of goods, ideas,
and information, and by supplying relatively scarce complementary resources
such as enterprise, capital, and specific skills. Without these contacts the Third
World would have remained much poorer than it now is.
The world comprises a very large number of societies and groups which have
emerged in varying degrees from a base of material poverty. In all cases, in the
Third World as in the east, the principal determinants of economic achievement
and performance have been human aptitudes, motivations, aspirations, mores,
mode of thought, social institutions, and political arrangements. It is these
which have either fostered or hindered the willingness to work, save, take risks,
and perceive and pursue economic opportunities.
Bauer & Yamey, supra note 13, at 28-29. John Rawls includes in the subject matter to
be assessed under a theory of justice, "major institutions" including "the principal
economic and social arrangements." J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 7 (1971).
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gies, the implementation of policy and the firmness of our re-
solve will determine our future decisions and action.
2
'
21. Richard Lowenthal compares the nationalist movements and communist move-
ments toward modernization and their challenge to the west:
For the nationalists, conflicts with Western imperialists are part of an uncom-
pleted struggle for final emancipation from the remnants of colonial rule, partic-
ularly from Western economic privileges, to be continued as long as Western
resistance to those limited objectives makes it necessary; for the Communists,
these conflicts are part of a world wide struggle that can end only with the total
demise of the capitalist order. Hence the Communist outlook, as distinct from
that of the nationalists, implies a basic unremitting hostility to the Western
powers which, though it need not lead to a major war, excludes the possibility
of substantial Western capital aid and requires a long-term, high-priority effort
in the field of armaments and the basic industries on which their production
depends. The combined result of excluding substantial Western aid and giving
long-term priority to arms production and basic industries is that a Communist
regime will normally have to demand from its subjects heavier and more lasting
sacrifices than a nationalist one in order to obtain the same degree of success in
development.
Lowenthal, Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy, in CHANGE IN COMMUNIST
SYSTEMS 33, 48-49 (C. Johnson ed. 1970).
Richard Pipes takes the view that the U.S.S.R. not only believes it can undertake
a nuclear war but that it can win it. Pipes, Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight
and Win a Nuclear War, 64 COMMENTARY 21 (1977). He argues that the U.S. appears
to be committed to a "strategy" (and he discounts this commitment as a "strategy"
in any event) of "mutual deterrence." This strategy is traced to a mixture of U.S.
attitudes toward war in general, its refusal to accept seriously the position of Clause-
witz that "[w]ar is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture
of other means," and the attempt to get off cheaply by assuming that a low cost
investment in nuclear deterrence is sufficient to maintain "mutual deterrence." In
Pipes' view the possibility of a destabilizing element in the deterrence balance may
be great enough to shift the security policy needs from a deterrence posture to a war-
fighting, war-surviving and war-winning posture, thereby opposing the posture which
the U.S.S.R. has assumed. He also argues that the U.S.S.R., in effect, encourages the
doctrine of "mutual deterrence," because like the Potemkin village, applied to doc-
trine, it will veil their own position, enhancing its strength. Id.
Leon Gourd, Foy Kohler and Mose Harvey argue that the U.S.S.R. view is not
"against nuclear war." Citing a major Soviet authority, Karabanov, they note,
the mutual suicide and no-victory line is now relatively rare in the Soviet Union.
The weight of opinion, and especially as voiced by military authorities, is that
while nuclear was "can cause substantial detriment to the development of world
civilization, inhibiting the advance of the revolutionary process," and that it
would result in the death of many millions of people and the destruction of some
countries, "there is profound erroneousness and harm in the disorienting claims
of bourgeois ideologies that there will be no victor in a thermonuclear world
war."
L. GouRg, F. KOHLER & M. HARVEY, THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN CURRENT SOVIET
STRATEGY 60 (1974) (footnote omitted), cited in Pipes, Why the Soviet Union Thinks
it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War, 64 COMMNrARY 21 (1977). See also L. GoUmE,
WAR SURWVAL IN SOVET STRATEGY 23 (1976).
On Clausewitz, see P. PARET, CLAUsEwrrz AND THE STATE (1976). Limited wars
seemingly have little persuasion for Clausewitz or U.S.S.R. strategy, even with the
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advent of nuclear weapons. This, at least, would appear to be the outcome of Sokolov-
skiy's arguments. V. SOKOLOVSKIY, SovEr MIrARY STRATEGY (3d ed. 1975). This posi-
tion was also taken by the Executive Secretary on U.S. Objectives and Programs for
National Security in the Report to the National Security Council. The report stated:
"The design, [of rulers of the U.S.S.R.] therefore, calls for the complete subversion
or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the
countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure
subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin." NSC-68, XXVII NAVAL WAR C. RRv.
51, 54 (1975). The entire matter is subject to controversy. See J. COLLINS, GRAND
STRATEGY 70 (1973).
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